Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 4.djvu/9

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

concentration on the mission of resistance to overt aggression; training from the top down; employment of U.S. standards and techniques; and optimistic assessment of the future capabilities of paramilitary organizations outside the purview of MAAG.

— The result of U.S. efforts was more a reflection of the U.S. military establishment than of the type of threat or terrain. With regard to the overall effectiveness of U.S. aid, it seems to have had, unfortunately, all the depth the term "mirror image" implies. Furthermore, U.S. performance in creating an effective Vietnamese military establishment was adversely affected by the lack of well-founded bargaining techniques vis-a-vis the Government of Vietnam, and by fragmentation and other inadequacies in the American system of determining and administering the overall program of assistance.

— The U.S. quickly became so deeply and so overtly committed to the Diem government that any leverage inherent in the assistance program rapidly approached zero, perhaps the best illustration of the lack of leverage concerning the defense establishment is the case of the Civil Guard, in which the principal effects of the U.S. bargaining were negative and most directly affected the very organization the U.S. was trying to improve.

— The case of the Civil Guard, a primary internal security force, also affords excellent examples of two sorts of fragmentation affecting the U.S. effort: U.S. interagency competition (the CG was ultimately transferred to the MOD on the advice of MAAG, but against not only the prior advice of the MSU advisory team but also against the wishes of the Embassy)^[1] and lack of coordination at Embassy level by which the entire military assistance effort could be evaluated and resources more rationally allocated (the Civil Guard was evaluated completely differently by MAAG and by the Embassy).

— A third variety of fragmentation is revealed in the relations between Washington and its various representatives in the field. Both the GVN and the several U.S. agencies relied heavily on Washington for arbitration of disputes

1. Fragmentation in the U.S. community had an obvious and adverse effect on the U.S. capability to bargain with the GVN. By devoting minimal care to the selection of the U.S. official he would talk to first, Diem could often become the arbiter of, rather than a participant in, the bargaining process. Thus General Williams: "I can't remember one time that president Diem ever did anything of importance concerning the military that I recommended against." "Why U.S. Is Losing in Vietnam," U.S. News and World Report, November 9, 1964.