Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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IV.C.
FOOTNOTES
| 1. | Report of the Saigon Military Mission (SMM), August 1954–August 1955 (S). |
| 2. | JCS telegram to CINCPAC 974802, 30 March 1960; JCSM-906–60, 15 September 1960. Cf. Duncanson, Dennis J., Government and Revolution in Vietnam, 1968, pp. 290–305. |
| 3. | Lawton Collins, Special Representative of the United States in Vietnam, "Report on Vietnam for the National Security Council," January 20, 1955 (TS). See also NSC documents throughout the period 1950–1960 which are consistent with this statement of objectives and consequences. |
| 4. | The key to this problem [the Indochina war] is a strong and effective Nationalist army with the support of the Populace behind it." Debriefing, M/General Thomas J. H. Trapnell, Jr., 3 May 1954, in OSD files 092/092.2 Indochina. U.S. decisionmakers seemed to agree virtually unanimously with this statement. |
| 5. | In April 1953 CHMAAG General Trapnell reported that French observers had returned from Korea with little but a list of reasons why U.S. training procedures could not be effectively applied in Indochina. Msg, CHMAAG Indochina to AC of S G-3 and CINFE, MG619A, DA-IN-257701, 15 April 53. Although the minutes of the Bipartite U.S.–French Conversations (First Session, April 22, 1953, 3:30 p.m., Quai d'Orsay) reported that "The French missions which have been received in Korea were very useful. Marshall Juin himself has brought back information the French propose to use in the formation of the Vietnam army," the qualifiers added, even at this high diplomatic level ("But the problem is not the same in Indochina as in Korea. The problems facing the two armies are not comparable, but some lessons can be applied") lend weight to the Trapnell Interpretation that the French visits to Korea had been largely a waste of time (S). |
| 6. | This plan, outlined to then Chargé d'Affaires Gullion, was dismissed as "fantastic," although it was seen that this Vietnamese attitude raised serious problems. Msg, Gullion to Acheson, 204, 25 March 1950 (S). History of the Indochina Incident, Historical Section, JCS. Series B, 1 February 1955 (TS). (Hereinafter referred to as JCS History.) In May 1954, Ngo Dinh Luyen, Bao Dai's personal representative, told Philip W. Bonsal that Bao Dai seeks U.S. help for the National Army. Memcon, May 18 and 20, 1954 (TS), OSD Files 1954. |
| 7. | Memorandum for SECDEF from Service Secretaries, "Draft State Department Statement on Indochina, dated 27 March 1952," 8 April 1952 (TS). |
| 8. | Memorandum for Record, "Meeting of President's Special Committee on Indochina, 29 January 1954," 30 January 1954 (TS). |
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