Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/243

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011


TOP SECRET – Sensitive

(3) assistance in fiscal matters; and

(4) improvement of Pathet Lao military forces.

A captured report to Hanoi, probably from this headquarters, indicated that by 1956 the Laotian Communist Party had expanded from less than 100 to more than 2,000 members, and that a light infantry, guerrilla force of more than fifteen battalions had been created. Apparently, Hanoi had planned to withdraw the Vietnamese cadre in late 1956, and there is evidence that some withdrawals took place by early 1957; there is also evidence that most DRV cadre remained. However, in 1957, with the aid of the ICC, a political settlement was reached. Two battalions of Pathet Lao surrendered to the Royal Laotian Government (RLG), to be incorporated into its army, and the Pathet Lao agreed to demobilize 5,000 other troops. Two officials of the Lao Fatherland Front were admitted to the Royal Laotian Government, and the movement ostensibly integrated into the national community.

During 1958 and early 1959, the Royal Laotian Government became increasingly pro-Western, and DRV activities in Laos were evidently attenuated. However, in May, 1959, when the Royal Laotian Army (RLA) attempted to disestablish its two Pathet Lao battalions, one escaped and marched for the DRV. DRV reaction was quick. Immediately thereafter U. S. intelligence was reliably informed that a military headquarters similar to the Viet Minh's Dien Bien Phu command post had been set up near the Laos border to control operations in Laos by the NVA 335th Division, which had been formed from the "Lao Volunteers" regrouped to the DRV in 1955. 198/ From mid-1959 onwards, the U.S. acquired convincing evidence of an increaslng DRV military involvement in Laos, and beginning in late 1960, of USSR entry into the conflict with substantial military aid for the Pathet Lao. The Pathet Lao aided by a severe weakening of the RLG from a neutralist coup by Kong Le in 1961, and a counter coup by right-wing forces in 1962, mount ed an offensive against the RLG to expand Pathet Lao controlled territory, which continued through a "cease-fire" of May, 1961.

It was not, however, until December, 1960, that the DRV announced to foreign diplomats resident in Hanoi its decision to intervene in Laos; during 1961 the DRV presence in Laos was transformed from a semi-covert MAAG-like undertaking to an operational theater. Beginning in December, 1960, and throughout 1961 and early 1962, Soviet aircraft flew 2,000 to 3,000 sorties from the DRV to Laos, delivering more than 3,000 tons of supplies to commun ist forces, which expanded their territory to hold the northern h a lf of the country. Ethnic North Vietnamese appeared in Pathet Lao formations, and Kong Le himself admitted that

NVA officers and soldiers were serving as "technicians" with his paratroops. North Vietnamese from NVA formations were captured by RIG forces and captured documents substantiated the presence of entire NVA units. In De c ember, 1961, a convoy of Soviet-made tanks was sighted entering Laos

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