Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
situation in order to formulate a program which we felt would be essential, and in October 1959, the armed struggle was launched.
"Was the armed struggle slow in coming? We realize that it was not possible to launch the arms struggle too soon, before the situation had ripened. At any rate, a short period of time was lost because although many areas were engaged in armed propaganda [terror-backed persecution] up to this time, it was limited to armed propaganda and insufficient strength existed to maintain continued opposition to the enemy. Although slow in coming, it was not too slow because there was still time to transform the situation into one where the proper conditions existed. However, if the change had been even slower, even more difficulties would have been encountered and the change in the movement would not have been as easy."
"The Resolution of the 15th Conference of the Central Committee officially and concisely specified the responsibilities and strategic aims of the South Vietnam revolution.
"But problems still existed: how were these responsibilities, aims, and progress of the South Vietnam revolution to be implemented? What must the main forms and procedures of the struggle be? Although the Resolution outlined some of these factors, at the time of the Conference, the details of the South Vietnam movement as well as revolutionary experiences of friendly nations were not sufficient enough for the Conference to formulate a precise program. Only 2 years later, were there sufficient factors available, based partly on the experiences of Laos but mainly on the experiences of the South Vietnam revolutionary movement, the Central Committee was able to formulate a clear and concise program concerning these problems .... "
The latter reference is to a January, 1961, Resolution of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party, which directed concentration on peasant problems, stressed political action--"The political aspect is truly the basic one," said the CRIMP history--and warned against "revisionism." The Lao Dong newspaper carried an editorial, broadcast by Radio Hanoi on 13 January 1961 which described the 1961 Resolution as a document which:
"Reaffirms and sheds more light on the thesis of the Declaration of 1957 concerning the forms of transition from capitalism to socialism in different countries and clearly points to the lines and methods of struggle of the communist parties of capitalist countries ....
"As for the colonial countries, the statement points out that the struggle for national independence should be waged through armed struggles or by non-military methods , according to the specific conditions in the country concerned. The working class, which plays a major role in the national liberation struggle, is determined to
