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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
U.S. PERCEPTIONS OF THE INSURGENCY, 1954-1960
TABLE OF CONTENTS and OUTLINE
Page | ||||
Chart - Principal Personalities, 1954-1960 | ii | |||
A. | U. S. Intelligence, 1954-1958 | 1 | ||
1. | Pre-Geneva, 1950-1954 | 1 | ||
2. | Geneva, 1954 | 4 | ||
3. | Sect Warfare, 1955-1957 | 7 | ||
4. | Rise of the Viet Cong, 1957-1960 | 17 | ||
B. | U.S. Policy and Programs, 1954-1960 | 26 | ||
1. | NSC 5612/1 | 27 | ||
2. | NSC 5809 | 28 | ||
3. | Public Statements | 32 | ||
4. | Program Data | 37 | ||
C. | Recognition of Crisis, 1960 | 43 | ||
1. | Country Team Assessment, March, 1960 | 43 | ||
a. | Viet Cong Activity | 43 | ||
b. | ARVN Weaknesses | 45 | ||
c. | Political Factors | 46 | ||
2. | Special NIE, August, 1960 | 48 | ||
3. | Contrasting DOD and State Appreciations | 52 | ||
4. | The Counterinsurgency Plan (CIP) | 80 | ||
a. | General McGarr Replaces General Williams | 82 | ||
b. | Content of the CIP | 86 | ||
c. | Presidential Action on the CIP | 95 | ||
d. | Implementing the CIP | 97 |
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TOP SECRET – Sensitive