Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
As early as the fall of 1955, limitations that later were to loom large on his ability to attract subordinate leadership were perceived:
" … His cabinet is composed primarily of loyal technicians who lack political stature. Most well known political figures of the pre-Diem period have been alienated by Diem's unwillingness to trust them and by his insistence that unquestioned acceptance of his leadership is the only basis for cooperation. Diem has depended heavily on his unpopular brothers for advice and entrusts them with positions of great responsibility. His tendency toward 'one man rule,' his dependence on his brothers for advice, and his rejection of Vietnamese leaders whom he does not trust, has denied his government many of the few trained administrators." (Ibid., pp. 3-4)
As for the public, when he took office in July 1954) the most significant political convictions of most South Vietnamese were "antipathy for the French combined with a personal regard for Ho Chi Minh as the symbol of Vietnamese Nationalism …" (Ibid., p. 2)
Diem's efforts to "galvanize mass popular support" concentrated initially on "exploiting popular antipathy for Bao Dai and the French" and subsequently on developing "strong anti-Communist sentiment" (Ibid., p. 4) Nevertheless, confronting a communist regime in North Vietnam "possessing a far stronger Army, a more experienced administration, greater cohesion of leadership and greater drive than the government of South Vietnam," and led by Ho Chi Minh, "Premier Diem will almost certainly not agree to a test of relative popular strength in national elections." (Ibid., p. 5)
Although no estimates in the 1955-1956 period assumed the communists would open guerrilla operations immediately upon the final frustration of their election hopes in July 1956, the estimates recognized increasing pressures upon the communists for recourse to violent methods of achieving their long-run objectives. The 19 October 1955 NIE held that:
" … They probably estimate that unless they effectively challenge the position of the Diem government the latter will gradually strengthen and stabilize its position. Moreover, they have probably concluded that Diem will not agree to elections or unification schemes which would favor the Communists. Under these circumstances the chances for a Communist take-over of the south by means short of open force might decline. On the other hand, the Communists also probably realize that the use of force against South Vietnam --
