Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
"South Vietnam has made only limited progress toward basic long-term economic development in the five years since independence … "
"The prospects for continued political stability in South Vietnam depend heavily upon President Diem and his ability to maintain firm control of the army and police. The regime's efforts to assure internal security and its belief that an authoritarian government is necessary to handle the country's problems will result in a continued repression of potential opposition elements. This policy of repression will inhibit the growth of popularity of the regime, and we believe that dissatisfaction will grow, particularly among those who are politically conscious … "
It was not until 1960 that U.S. intelligence estimates began to reflect conviction that Diem's political base had in fact been seriously eroded, and that the DRV-supported Viet Cong posed a vital threat. The intelligence of 1960 is treated in detail in Section C, below; suffice to say for the purposes of this summary, mounting rural violence validated the estimate of the 1959 NIE that a concerted and dangerous Viet Cong attack on the GVN was underway.
GVN Internal Security Indicators
in NIE & SNIE, 1958-1961
| 1958 | 1959 | 1960 | |
| Assassinations of GVN Officials & Backers |
193 | 239 | 1400 |
| Kidnappings | 236 | 344 | 700 |
But the most remarkable index of the Viet Cong upsurge was their reported zooming strength:
