Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
psychological preparation in terms of the benefits to be gained. Since most of these projects call for sacrifice on the part of the population (in the form of allegedly 'volunteer' labor in the case of construction, time away from jobs or school in the case of rural youth groups, leaving homes and lands in the case of regrouping isolated peasants), they are bound to be opposed unless they represent a partnership effort for mutual benefit on the part of the population and the government. (See subsequent section on 'GVN Reactions' for indications of Diem's current awareness of this problem.)
"The situation may be summed up in the fact that the government has tended to treat the population with suspicion or to coerce it and has been rewarded with an attitude of apathy or resentment. The basic factor which has been lacking is a feeling of rapport between the government and the population. The people have not identified themselves with the government. There has been a general lack of 'a sense of mission' in the building of the country among both the local population and local authorities." (Ibid., pp. 9, 10, 11, 12; footnotes excluded)
2. Special National Intelligence Estimate, August 1960
The Country Team report on internal security concluded that Diem was now aware of the gravity of the problem and was taking some countermeasures. But the inadequacy of his response was recognized in a Special NIE of 23 August 1960 (SNIE 63.1-60). The VC terrorism had continued to intensify: in the first five months of 1960, 780 government officials and sympathizers were assassinated by insurgents. Since January armed attacking units had been operating over wider areas than at any time since 1954.
" … Support from North Vietnam appears to have increased over the past several months. In particular, senior cadres and military supplies such as communications equipment are believed to be moving south through Laos and Cambodia and by junk along the eastern coastline." (SNIE 63.1-6-0, p. 3)
But along with this further increase in communist pressure came increasing threats to stability from non-communist quarters reminiscent of the 1954-55 period:
" … At the same time, grievances against the government, which have long been accumulating, have become increasingly urgent and articulate."
Throughout this August estimate, dual threats from communist and domestic opposition were presented in parallel, with priority
