Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/331

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011


TOP SECRET – Sensitive

" … Permit National Assembly wider legislative initiative and area of genuine debate and bestow on it authority to conduct) with appropriate publicity) public investigations of any department of government with right to question any official except President himself. This step would have three-fold purpose: (A) Find some mechanism for dispelling through public investigation constantly generated rumors about government and its personalities; (B) Provide people with avenue recourse against arbitrary actions by some government officials; (C) Assuage some of intellectual opposition to government.

" … Require all government officials to declare publicly their property and financial holdings and give National Assembly authority to make public investigation of these declarations in effort dispel rumors of corruption."

" … Adopt following measures for immediate enhancement of peasant support of government: (A) Establish mechanism for increasing price peasant will receive for paddy crop beginning to come on market in December) either by direct subsidization or establishment state purchasing mechanism; (B) Institute modest payment for all corvee labor; (C) Subsidize agroville families along same lines as land resettlement families until former on feet economically; (D) Increase compensation paid to youth corps. If Diem asks how these measures are to be financed I shall suggest through increased taxes or increased deficit financing) and shall note that under certain circumstances reasonable deficit financing becomes a politically necessary measure for governments. I should add that using revenues for these fundamental and worthy purposes would be more effective than spending larger and larger sums on security forces, which, while they are essential and some additional funds for existing security forces may be required, are not complete answer to current problems." (Saigon 624 to SecState, Section 2 of 2) 16 September 1960) pp. 1-2) underlining added)

Finally, in requesting State Department approval for an approach to Diem along these lines, Durbrow concluded with a recommendation on the nature of the political objectives the U.S. should set with respect to the GVN:

"We believe U. S. should at this time support Diem as best available Vietnamese leader, but should recognize that overriding U.S. objective is strongly anti-communist Vietnamese government which can command loyal and enthusiastic support of widest possible segments of Vietnamese people, and is able to carry on effective fight against communist guerrillas. If Diem's position in country continues deteriorate as result failure adopt proper political, psychological, economic and security measures, it

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TOP SECRET – Sensitive