Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
re-establish themselves. The regular military establishment of South Vietnam has the capability to fight either guerrillas or external aggressors. Militia type home guards and civil guards should be trained and equipped. Accelerated efforts should be undertaken to develop the para-military and police forces. For the duration of the emergency campaign, operational control of all security activities should be under centralized direction. Border and Coastal Patrol operations, being fundamental to the campaign to prevent insurgents receiving support from areas outside of South Vietnam, should be closely coordinated with Vietnamese ground, air, and naval operations in the counter-insurgency campaign. These operations should also be coordinated with Cambodia and laos, as feasible." (Defense 982994 to CINCPAC, 162156z Sep 60)
The State Department, accepting the recommendations of the Department of Defense, sent a State-Defense message instructing the Ambassador of the country team to develop an overall plan
" … for encouraging and supporting GVN in national emergency effort defeat insurgents and bring about order and stability in that country. Such action determined necessary in order check disruptive influences which could cause disintegration of the Government and the possible loss of South Viet-Nam to Communist Bloc." (Deptel 658 to Arrillnbassy Saigon, 19 October 1960)
Before making known such a plan to the GVN it would be reviewed in Washington and a U.S. position established. {{quote|After these somewhat differing analyses of the problem had been recorded, an abortive coup by troops which had been regarded as among the most loyal in ARVN, the airborne brigade, appeared to validate concerns (expressed by the State Department and the August 30 SNIE) over non-communist dissatisfactions with the Diem regime. Yet Washington interpretations of the coup and its aftermath were that it confirmed not only the Ambassador, but his critics within the DOD in their respective convictions.
Ambassador Durbrow described certain measures of reform promised by Diem after the coup but commented:
"It is hoped that these reforms are not just reforms on surface with little or no substance. Despite these Signs, there is basically quite serious under-current malaise and skepticism whether effective reforms will be taken soon enough. This uneasy feeling not confined to intellectuals or opposition groups; but to sizeable number of others, i.e., cabinet
