Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
" … U. S. would as Plan provides expect GVN absorb local currency costs these increases and does not contemplate further US-? dollar grants to generate additional local currency for this purpose." (Joint State-Defense-ICA Message, Deptel 1054 to Saigon, 3 February 1961, p. 1)
The Department suggested that the Ambassador and the Chief, MAAG, prepare an abridged version of the plan to present to Diem and emphasized:
" … immediate purpose Plan is to enable GVN defeat insurgency, but Plan also envisages that GVN must move on political front towards liberalization to retain necessary popular cooperation; that various economic steps be taken; and that there be adequate cooperation with RKG on frontier control. It considered US view that success requires implementation entire plan."
" … Future funding will require Congressional approval. Views Congress likely be influenced by developments in political as well as security situation. FY 61 component represents large increase in US support Viet-Nam.' If GVN willing to accept the obligations involved in its implementation, the US is ready give full and immediate support in carrying it out." (Ibid., pp. 1-2)
In a passage suggesting some naivete on the part of the Department as to actual working procedures and the rhythm of negotiations in Saigon, the Department suggested:
" … proposing to Diem that members US Missions ready confer with GVN opposite numbers work out agreed version Plan within, say two week time limit … " (Ibid., p. 2)
The guidance concluded:
"If Ambassador considers GVN does not provide necessary cooperation, he should inform Washington with recommendations which may include suspension US contribution." (Ibid., p. 3)
On 2 February 1961 Walt W. Rostow showed the new President the memorandum on Vietnam' written by General Lansdale (reproduced above). The President read it in Rostow's presence, and said, "This is the worst yet … You know Ike never briefed me about Vietnam … " It has been reported that shortly thereafter Lansdale was summoned unexpectedly to the White House, and was ushered into a meeting of principle Cabinet and National Security Council
