Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
12 villagers were killed; in another locality, Ba Lang, other incidents of violence were reported which led to 200 arrests.56 It was the view of the Indian and Polish members of the ICC, however, that despite these incidents "by the 18th of May (1955) the bulk of the persons who wanted to change the zone of their residence had succeeded in doing so." The Canadian member dissented and submitted a minority report detailing other examples of forceful obstruction of refugees by DRV authorities or crowds, and concluded these were "deliberately planned." Moreover, the Canadians were convinced that the DRV had so effectively restricted ICC inspections that: "it's still not possible to say whether all persons wishing to move from one zone to the other have been able to do so."57 Estimates of the numbers of persons prevented from migrating from North Vietnam range from Asian scholar Ellen Hammer's "several fold" those who left, and Diem's estimate of twice the number who reached the South, to Robert Shaplen's "no more than 400,000," and B.S.N. Murti of the ICC, who thinks a number approaching 2,000 likely.58
- 5. Impact of the Exodus: North
Whatever the DRV's intentions concerning the exodus, the numbers of refugees who were permitted to depart speaks for itself: if the estimate of 900,000 is correct, the DRV witnessed the flight of 1 out of every 13 of its citizens at a time when, ostensibly, votes and labor were important to its future. It should be noted that the DRV capitalized upon the abandoned land and other property of the refugees in its initial wealth redistribution schemes, and thus had motive to encourage, rather than impede, departures.59 The timing of the uproar with the ICC over violations of Article 14(d) suggests an answer: the incidents observed by the ICC in the North, as well as manifestations in the South of discontent with Saigon's observance of the agreement, multiplied after October, 1954, and peaked toward May, 1955, indicating that the DRV pursued a progressively more ruthless policy on departures.60 In seeking to attenuate the outflow, the DRV undoubtedly resorted to stringent measures, at least in certain localities. Whether these measures approached the depravities depicted by Trager and others cannot be adjudicated with present evidence, but it is clear that refugees provided an early and severe test of the DRV's capability for humane and democratic action consistent with the Geneva Settlement—and in the eyes of many observers in South Vietnam and the West, the DRV failed abjectly, seriously damaging its position vis-a-vis the plebescite.61 Within North Vietnam, the refugee experience developed deep divisions between the DRV and rural Catholics which were to persist more than a year after the Geneva movement arrangement expired.
- 6. Impact of the Exodus: South
For the GVN, the influx of 900,000 people presented problems of paralyzing proportions. Within a few months of Ngo Dinh Diem's taking office, Saigon was ringed with shabby encampments whose inhabitants were wholly dependent on the already overburdened government. Had
