Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/85

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011


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50.  Frank N. Trager, Why Viet Nam? (New York: Praeger, 1966), 97.
51.  U.S. Intelligence Advisory Committee, Viet Minh Violations of the Geneva Agreements Through 31 December 1954 (IAC-D-93/2, 31 January 1965), 5–8; Also, Anita L. Nutt, Troika on Trial (MS Study for OSD/ISA, ARPA Contract SD-220, 1967), 410–419; CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review (12 August 1954), 8; CIA, NSC Briefing, 25 January 1955—the latter cites a Canadian priest as source for reports of serious fighting in Vinh, Nghe An and Ba Lang, Thanh Hoa Province.
52.  ICC, Fourth Interim Report..., op. cit., 12.
53.  Ibid., 11, 21. The Canadians reported 11,422 first party petitions in the North, and not more than 1,000 in the South upon which no action had been taken as of 18 May 1955.
54.  Ibid., 12.
55.  Ibid.
56.  Murti, op. cit., 76–79; CIA, NSC Briefing, 25 Jan 55.
57.  ICC, Fourth Interim Report, op. cit., 12–13, 23-24 . The Canadian report includes the following:

"The reports of the teams disclosed further that incidents of obstruction and hinderance made it difficult for them to complete their tasks effectively. A common experience was to encounter organized groups of persons presenting petitions about forced evacuation and demonstrating in a noisy and disorderly manner, with the effect that not only was the limited time available to the team for its investigation squandered, but also would-be evacuees were intimidated....In at least a dozen instances, intending evacuees were physically molested by such hostile crowds and sometimes forcibly dragged away before they had an opportunity of meeting the team. Team 56 on its visit to Ha Tinh on five occasions saw individuals physically molested and dragged by force from the presence of the team....In our view this phenomenon was not a mere social manifestation but an organized plan. While it has been impossible for the Commission to prove that these measures were organized as a matter of policy by the authority in control of the North, owing to the frequency and the common features of this form of obstruction in all provinces investigated there would seem to be little doubt that these obstructions and hinderances had been deliberately planned...it is still not possible to say whether all persons wishing to move from one zone to the other have been able to do so...."

58.  Hammer, op. cit., 345; Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 114-115; Murti, op. cit., 91-92.
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