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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
| DATE | EVENT OR DOCUMENT | DESCRIPTION |
| 11 Aug 1961 | Kennedy Decision NSAM 65 |
President Kennedy agreed vith the Staley Report (of 4 August) that security requirements demanded first priority, that economic and social programs had to be accelerated, that it was in the US interest to promote a viable Vietnam, He agreed to support an ARVN increase to 200,000 if Diem in turn agreed to a plan for using these forces. The 270,000 level was thus disapproved. But the plan for using ARVN forces had not yet been drawn. Diem had not yet designed -- much less implemented -- social reforms supposedly required in return for US assistance. |
| 15 Aug 1961 | NIE 14-3/53.61 | Although collapse of the Saigon regime might come by a coup or from Diem's death, its fall because of a "prolonged and difficult" struggle was not predicted. |
| Late Aug 1961 | Theodore White Reports | "The situation gets worse almost week by week…" particularly the military situation in the delta. If the U.S. decides it must intervene, White asked if we had the people, instruments or clear objectives to make it successful. |
| 1 Sep 1961 | General McGarr Reports | The ARVN has displayed increased efficiency, a spirit of renewed confidence is "beginning to permeate the people, the GVN and the Armed Forces." |
| 27 Sep 1961 | Nolting Reports | Nolting was "unable report…progress toward attainment task force goals of creating viable and increasingly democratic society," called the government and civil situation unchanged from early September. A series of large scale VC attacks in central Vietnam, the day-long VC seizure of Phuoc Vinh, capital of [former] Phuoc Thanh Province -- 55 miles from Saigon -- in |
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TOP SECRET – Sensitive
