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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
| DATE | EVENT OR DOCUMENT | DESCRIPTION |
| 1 Nov 1961 (Continued) |
cessively difficult or unpleasant place to operate" and the "risks of backing into a major Asian war "by way of SVN" are not impressive: North Vietnam "is extremely vulnerable to conventional bombing…there is no case for fearing a mass onslaught of communist manpower…particularly if our air power is allowed a free hand against logistical targets…" | |
| 3 Nov 1961 | Taylor Report | The "Evaluation and Summary" section suggested urgency and optimism: SVN is in trouble, major U.S. interests are at stake; prompt and energetic U.S. action -- military, economic, political -- can lead to victory without a U.S. take-over of the war, can cure weaknesses in the Diem regime. That the Vietnamese must win the war was a unanimous view -- but most mission participants believed all Vietnamese operations could be substantially improved by America's "limited partnership" with the GVN. The GVN is cast in the best possible light; any suggestion that the U.S. should limit rather than expand its commitment -- or face the need to enter the battle in full force at this time -- is avoided. Underlying the summary was the notion that "graduated measures on the DRV (applied) with weapons or our own choosing" could reverse any adverse trend in the South. And ground troops were always possible. The Taylor Report recommended the U.S. make obvious its readiness to act, develop reserve strength in the U.S. "to cover action in Southeast Asia up to the nuclear threshold in that area" and thereby sober the enemy and discourage escalation. However, bombing was a more likely Vietnam contingency than was use of ground troops; the latter |
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TOP SECRET – Sensitive
