Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
mediocre people would be squabbling among themselves for power while the Communists took over. The Communists will be more alert to exploit the next coup attempt.… 8/
Lansdale's view was not immediately taken up, even though Hilsman reports that his presentation impressed Kennedy enough to start the President thinking about sending the General to Saigon as our next Ambassador. 9/ Instead, Kennedy made what was under the circumstances the easiest, least time-consuming decision, which was simply to let the Ambassador he had inherited, from the Eisenhower Administration go forward and make a try with the plan and negotiating tactics already prepared.
Durbrow's guidance specifically tells him (in instructions he certainly found suited his own view perfectly):
…considered U.S. view (is) that success requires implementation entire plan… If Ambassador considers GVN does not provide necessary cooperation; he should inform Washington with recommendations which may include suspension U.S. contribution. 10/
III. NEGOTIATING THE CIP
Kennedy's approval of the CIP apparently was seen as quite a routine action. None of the memoirs of the period give it any particular attention. And, although both Schlesinger and Hilsman refer to General Lansdale's report as shocking the President about the state of things in Vietnam, that report itself does not criticize the CIP, or the adequacy of its programs.
The guidance to Durbrow assumed agreement could be reached "within two weeks." This choice of language in the guidance cable implies that we believed Diem would quickly agree on the terms of the CIP, and the question of using pressure against him ("suspension of U.S. contribution") would only arise later, should he fail to follow through on his part of the agreement. 11/
As it turned out, Durbrow's efforts took a more complicated form. Even reaching a nominal agreement on the CIP took about 6 weeks. Then, Durbrow recommended holding up what is constantly referred to as "the green light" on increased aid until Diem had actually signed decrees implementing his major promises.
On March 8 (in response to a Washington suggestion for stepping up some aid prior to agreement on the CIP), Saigon cabled that:
…despite pressure of Biibassy and MAAG; GVN has not decreed the required measures and will continue to delay unless highly pressured to act. 12/
