Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. C. 1.djvu/52

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive

anything resembling an IG inquiry might have brought about morale problems that it was well to avoid. The reverse of the coin was that formalized coordination of intelligence stood the chance of stifling or concealing minority dissent. It was indeed the basic mission of the group to set up checks. But in the extent to which this system of checks were to be coordinated with the system as a whole, it risked losing some part of its independence of the accepted view. And it had been the accepted view that had been proved wrong.

By the time full agreement was reached on the terms of reference for the team, the team was already in Saigon, A month later it submitted a report evaluating the situation in Viet Nam at about the same time that the CAS station chiefs submitted two other evaluations which were apparently for a time mistakenly attributed to the TDY team. These evaluations caused enough uneasiness within the country team to indicate that interpretation of intelligence and situation appraisals remained the touchy matter that the Secretary had foreseen. The "Initial Report of CAS Group Findings in SVN," dated 10 February 1964 began by acknowledging that the group activities had been temporarily disrupted by the Khanh Coup of 30 January (which will be described later), and did not attempt to report on the covert cross checks because before covert cross checks could be established it was necessary to learn the pattern and nature of the reporting system then in use, both American and Vietnamese. 33/ The first appraisals, therefore, were expressly based solely on a new look at what the existing system reported. The first impression of the group was that for the most part the Vietnamese had been reporting honestly to their American counterparts since the 1 November coup and that if current reporting was indeed biased it was biased against the Diem regime.

The first general impression of the situation, expressly subject to further inquiry, was that "the momentum of the strategic hamlet program has slowed practically to a halt." More specific evaluations, which focused on local situations north and east of Saigon and took up most of this initial report,^ were more pessimistic than the "general impression." Within Binh Long Province, security had deteriorated rapidly during January and the VC now controlled route 13. Well planned and viciously executed VC attacks on hamlets had caused wide fear, and produced doubt among the populace that the GVN could protect them. The former province chief and deputy chief for military operations had been replaced just two days before the Khanh coup. The response to the Khanh coup had been one of disgust. Phuoc Thanh Province, according to the province chief, was 80% controlled by the VC. The VC controlled the roads, making GVN travel impossible without large armed escorts. The VC were moving freely in battalion size units with heavy weapons throughout the province. COMUSMACV had reported that the one to one GVN/VC ratio in the province was misleading because many of the GVN units were tied down in static positions whereas the VC were mobile.

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TOP SECRET – Sensitive