Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. C. 1.djvu/72

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive

sion, with special consideration to advantages derivable "from making it an overt Vietnamese program with participation by U.S. as required to obtain adequate results." 57/

The language and the tone of this message suggest that, however pessimistic may have been the appraisals, of the situation, there was no disposition to recognize any doubt that the struggle could be won or that we would undertake whatever measures were necessary to win it. Previously unprecedented escalatory measures of a military nature were beginning to be studied tentatively as a response to the bad news that kept coming. Most of these were to be rejected, for the time being, except for moves to convey to NVN that an exchange of air blows between NVN and SVN was a possibility. This, it was hoped, might exploit NVN fears that if they persisted aiding the VC they faced the loss of their industrial establishment. The inferential significance of our considerations at this time seems to have been that we were already committed, by the momentum of our past actions, to a course which forbade turning back, however reluctant we might be about taking any forward step.

A schedule for the trip v/as set up extending from the planned arrival on 8 March 1964 through 12 March. In the course of five days of briefings, conferences, and field trips, most of the details of a program, to implement policies already evidently largely agreed upon, were decided upon in the light of views and information elicited from our own and GVN officials. In the final meeting with General Khanh and his GVN associates, most of the programs for Vietnam which were later to be recommended to the President by Secretary McNamara were discussed. The exchange of views at that time was made a matter of record by a memcon, a summary of which was transmitted the next day by Ambassador Lodge.

General Khanh…proposed National Service Act for SVN. Khanh said his government prepared embark upon program to mobilize all human and material resources to fight VC. As envisaged by General Khanh proposed National Service Act would have two major components: military service and civil defense…

Military service comprised of: RVWAF… (actual strength: 227,000; planned: 251,683); Civil Guard (actual: 90,032; planned: 119,636). SDC & Hamlet Militia… (actual: 257,960; planned: 422,874). Civil Defense comprised of Civil Service Corps, Cadre Corps, National Youth, and Political-Administration Corps…

Civil Defense component included Civil Administration Corps for work in countryside. Khanh emphasized that in civil defense sector all civilians would be included…this segment also included civic action teams for hamlets and villages.

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TOP SECRET – Sensitive