NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET – Sensitive
for the U.S. to "support a program of national mobilization (including a national service law) to put South Vietnam on a war footing."
A second measure under this heading was to strengthen the armed forces, both regular and paramilitary, by at least 50,000 men. Of these, about 15,000 would be required to fill the regular armed forces (ARVN) to their current authorized strength, 5,000 would be needed to fill the existing paramilitary forces to their authorized strengths, and the remaining 30,000 would be to increase the strength of the paramilitary forces. To this end it was specifically recommended that the U. S. "assist the Vietnamese to increase the armed forces (regular plus paramilitary) by at least 50,000 men."
The third measure of mobilization was to assist in an increase of the civil administrative corps of Vietnam by an additional 7,500 in 1964, with the ultajnate target of at least 40,000 men for service in 8,000 hamlets and 2,500 villages, and in 3 provincial centers. It was specified that in accomplishing this the United States should work with the GVN to devise necessary recruiting plans, training facilities, financing methods and organizational arrangements, and should furnish training personnel at once under the auspices of the AID mission. The specific recommendation was "to assist the Vietnamese to create a greatly enlarged civil administrative corps for work at province, district and hamlet levels."
The improvement of SVN military forces was to be accomplished not only by the Increase in numbers specified above, but also by internal reforms and organizational improvements. What remained of the current hamlet militia and related forces of part-time nature for hamlet defense should be consolidated with the self-defense corps into a single force which would be compensated by the national government. The pay and collateral benefits of the paramilitary groups should be substantially improved. Strength of the forces should be maintained and expanded by effectively enforced conscription measures and by more centrally directed recruitment policies. It was recommended that U.S. personnel should be assigned to the training of the paramilitary forces. The National Police required further special consideration. An offensive guerrilla force should be created to operate along the border and in areas where VC control was dominant. These measures were included in specific recommendations to "assist the Vietnamese to improve and reorganize the paramilitary forces and to increase their compensation" and "to assist the Vietnamese to create an offensive guerrilla force."
Under the last two headings there were recommendations to provide the Vietnamese Air Force with 25 A-1H aircraft in exchange for their T-28s and to provide the Vietnamese Army additional M-113 APCs (withdrawing the M-114s there) and also to provide additional river boats and approximately 5 to 10 million dollars worth of related additional materiel. A
