NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
unless they felt they could count on Soviet support and that we could bring great economic pressure to bear on the Chinese through our allies. While expressing the opinion that Hanoi's renunciation of the Viet Cong would "take the heart out of the Insurgency," he indicated doubt that elimination of North Vietnam's. industrial targets would have much of an adverse impact on it. Moreover, the Secretary acknowledged the possibility that such an act "would have forfeited the 'hostage' which we hold in the North...without markedly affecting the fight against the Viet Cong, at least in the short run."
The major immediate outcome of the meeting was a decision to go ahead with the suggestion to arrange for the visit of a third country interlocutor to Hanoi. On 30 April, Secretary Rusk visited Ottawa and obtained an agreement from the Canadian Government to include such a mission among the instructions for its new I.C.C. representative. According to the agreement, the new official, J. Blair Seaborn, would: (1) try to determine Ho's attitude toward Chinese support, whether or not he feels over-extended, and his aims in South Vietnam; (2) stress U.S. determination to see its objectives in South Vietnam achieved; (3) emphasize the limits of U.S. aims in Southeast Asia and that it vented no permanent bases or installations there; and (4) convey U.S. willingness to assist forth Vietnam with its economic problems. Other results of the Saigon meeting consisted of a variety of actions recommended by Secretary Rusk. Of these, only four were related to the issue of military pressures against North Vietnam. These were recommendations to (1) engage "more flags" in efforts directly supporting the GVN; (2) deploy a carrier task force to establish a permanent U.S, naval presence at Can Ranh Bay; (3) initiate anti-Junk operations that would "inch northward" along the Vietnam coast; and (4) enlist SEATO countries in an effort to isolate the RV from economic or cultural relations with the Free World. [63]
D. Conflict of Short and Long Term Views: Caution Prevails
During the last week of April and the early weeks of May, the contention between those urging prompt measures and those counseling a deliberate, cautious pacing of our actions continued. For example, Walt Roston urged Secretary Rusk to consider how difficult it would be to rake a credible case in support of actions to force Hanoi's adherence to the Geneva Accords if political deterioration took place in Laos and South Vietnam. Predicting such an eventuality in the coming months, he implied that the necessary actions should be taken soon. 64/ Similarly, Ambassador Lodge continued to advocate prompt implementation of his carrot and stick approach including, if VC provocations warranted, a well-tired repriss just prior to Commissioner Seaborn's arrival in Hanoi. These views were communicated to Secretary McNamara and Willian Sullivan during their visit to Saigon 12-13 May, and confirmed in a cable to the President three days later.
The JCS commented on the final version of the State-ISA political-military scenarios and criticized them for not including the more immediate actions requested in NSA 288: namely, border control and retaliatory
