Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. C. 2. a.djvu/60

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

Concurrently: An effort should be made to strengthen the posture in South Vietnam. Integrating (interleading in a single chain of command) the South Vietnamese and U.S. military and civilian elements critical to pacification, down. at least to the district level, might be undertaken.

5 (D-16) Direct CINCIAC to take all prepositioning and logistic actions that can be taken 'quietly for the D-Day forces and the forces described in Paragraph 17 below.

6. (D-15) Get Khanh's agreement to start overt South Vietnamese air attacks against targets in the North (see D-Day item 15 below), and inform him of U.S. guarantee to protect South Vietnam In the event of North Vietnamese and/or Chinese retaliation.

7 (D-14) Consult with Thailand and the Philippines to get permission for U.S. deployments; and consult with them plus U.K. Australia, New Zealand and Pakistan, asking for their open political cal support for the undertaking and for their participation in the re-enforcing action to be undertaken in anticipation of North Vietnamese and or Chinese retaliation.

8 (D-13) Release an expended 'Jordan Report,' including recent photography and evidence of the communications nets, giving. full documentation of North Vietnamese supply and direction of the Viet Cong.

9 (D-12) Direct CINCPAC to begin moving forces and making specific plans on the assumption that strikes will be made on D-Day (see Attachment B* In backup materials for deployments).

10 (D-10) Khanh makes speech demanding that North Vietnam stop aggression, threatening unspecified military action if he does not. (He could refer to a 'carrot.')

11(D-3) Discussions with Allies not covered in Item 7 above.

12 (D-3) President Informs U.S. public (and thereby North Vietnam) that action may come, referring to Khanh speech (Item 10 above) and declaring support for South Vietnam.

13(D-1) Khanh announces that all efforts have failed and that attacks are imminent. (Again he refers to limited goal and possibly to "carrot.")

14. (D-Ley) Remove U.S. dependents.

23
TOP SECRET – Sensitive