NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
be undertaken outside the SEATO framework. As Secretary Rusk pointed out, "Souvanna Phouma might well call on individual SEATO nations for help, but was less likely to call on SEATO as an organization." Besides, the French and Pakistani were expected to be obstructive and the Philippines Government was regarded as presenting a constant threat of untimely leaks. Consensus was reached that the starting point for our bilateral consultations should be Thailand, since that government's confidence in the sincerity of the U.S. commitment seemed particularly needful of being shored up. At the meeting, Ambassador Martin echoed the themes which he had reported earlier in cables -- that the Thais were not convinced that we meant to stop the course in Southeast Asia and probably would not participate in or permit allied troop build-ups in their country without firmer assurances than had been given in the past. [103]
Another preliminary step discussed by the conferees was the desirability of obtaining a Congressional resolution prior to wider U.S. action in Southeast Asia. Ambassador Lodge questioned the need for it if we were to confine our actions to "tit-for-tat" air attacks against North Vietnam. However, Secretaries McNamara and Rusk and CIA Director McCone all argued. in favor of the resolution. In support, McNamara pointed to the need to guarantee South Vietnam's defense against retaliatory air attacks and against more drastic reactions by North Vietnam and Communist China. He "added that it might be necessary, as the action unfolded..to deploy as many as seven divisions." Rusk noted that some of the military requirements might involve the calling up of reserves, always a touchy Congressional issue: He also stated that public opinion on our Southeast Asian policy was badly divided in the United States at the moment and that, therefore, the President needed an affirmation of support. [104]
Next, the discussion turned to present estimates of communist reaction to attacks on North Vietnam:
"General Taylor summarized the present Washington view, to the effect that there would certainly be stepped-up Viet Cong activity in South Vietnam, Communist Chinese air might be sent to North Vietnam, Hanoi itself might send some ground forces south (though probably only on a limited scale), and there was the final possibility that the Communist Chinese would respond with significant military action. As to the last, he made clear that he did not visualize a 'yellow horde' of Chinese pouring into Southeast Asia, and that air interdiction could have a significant effect in reducing the number of forces the Communist Chinese could send down and support...In any case, he said that the military judgment was that seven ground divisions would be needed if the Communist Chinese employed their full capabilities in the dry season, and five divisions even in the wet season. The needed five-seven divisions could come in part from the Thai and others, but a major share would have to be borne by the U.S.
