Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
3. RVNAF, knowing the availability of support from U.S. reaction forces, would perform more aggressively.
4. This would permit the patrolling and securing of populated areas to be accomplished primarily by Vietnamese forces.
5. U.S. forces would keep active in what is now the enemy's zone of movement, no longer presenting static positions against, which the enemy can mass and attack. This, plus his increased logistical problems, would reduce U.S. casualties while increasing his. In effect, we would force him to come to us, fight on terrain of our choosing
7. Garrisoning U.S. forces closer to RVNAF would facilitate joint operations at the maneuver level (battalion, company), again increasing RVNAF aggressiveness.
8 . with RVNAF thus supported by U.S. forces, it can be expected to remain in uniform and engage in operations as long as it is paid and fed. 54
No disadvantages of this strategy were noted. or listed in the memorandum.
Details of this strategy, by Corps area, were examined in an appendix. In I Corps, our present precarious position could be relieved.
Were MACV to be provided guidance to forego position defense in areas remote from population centers and concentrate upon mobile offensive operations in and contiguous to the coastal plain, one division equivalent - eight to 10 U.S. maneuver battalions - could eventually be relieved from operations in, or related to defense of Khe Sanh. Undoubtedly, however, these eight to 10 battalions would be required to restore tactical flexibility to and insure logistical sufficiency for the forces presently disposed in the Quang-Tri-Hue-Danang area. MACV presently is planning operations in the Aeschau [Sic] Valley after April 1968; the new guidance would preclude these.
Guidance to MACV in II Corps
"...should counsel continued economy of force and should specifically exclude determined defense of all but province
