Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 3. a.djvu/158

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET — SECURITY INFORMATION

396.1-WA/7-1553

b) Increase in total forces available to create substantial strategic reserve permit French initiative. These additional forces include 12 battalions from France with 50 helicopters, 3 LSTs and 2 Pocket (repeat Pocket) Liberty ships, 30 C-47s, and 6 Beavers (repeat Beavers).

Obviously most serious problem relates to 12 infantry battalions. Politically raises grave problem sending conscripts to Indochina and this at very time when popular sentiment against war crystalizing in France. Militarily it would mean sharp reduction in French strength in Europe and North Africa. He estimated following units would have to be deactivated as result cadre and support requirements of 12 battalion force for Indochina: 8 or 9 artillery groups, 6 or 7 engineer battalions, h armored regiments, 3 or 4 signal companies and 8 or 9 ordnance companies.

All this has serious financial implications. Bidault stated that provisional French 1954 budget now includes 482 billion francs for Indochina and implementation Navarre plan would result in additional 20 billion francs. At same time Bidault understood US requesting $400 million to aid Indochina war and §40 million for direct assistance to Associated States (Stassen corrected this last figure to $25 million and pointed out both $400 million and $25 million amounts were only illustrative). While Bidault did not make any precise request of US he clearly indicated because France's financial condition these amounts of aid would not adequate permit above French expenditures.

Referring all aspects Indochina war in France Bidault pointed to basic and delicate political problem in Parliament where generally speaking those who support Indo-Chinese war (i.e., more Quote national Unquote element) oppose EDC and vice versa. This crisscross of political sentiment complicated his over-all task immeasurably.

Secretary expressed understanding for French difficulties and said outline Navarre plan had impressed us favorably because of its offensive features. General O'Daniel was now preparing his full report and upon completion it would be given urgent and careful consideration with view determining what financial aid could be given, which of course would depend on Congress.

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