Page:Philip Morris Companies v. Miner.pdf/13

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Cite as 2015 Ark. 73

We do not comment on what evidence is sufficient to prove plaintiffs' damages claims under the ADTPA. Such an inquiry would require us to delve into the merits, which we will not do. But the existence of damages, at least for some plaintiffs, will depend on whether Philip Morris misrepresented its product. So the individualized inquiry regarding damages will not destroy predominance: "[T]he mere fact that individual issues and defenses may be raised by the defendant regarding the recovery of individual class members cannot defeat class certification where there are common questions concerning the defendant's alleged wrongdoing that must be resolved for all class members." Simpson Hous. Solutions, LLC v. Hernandez, 2009 Ark. 480, at 17, 347 S.W.3d 1, 12. The same goes for Philip Morris's affirmative defenses based on the statute of limitations, failure to mitigate damages, and the voluntary-payment rule. These are secondary to the "common questions concerning" Philip Morris's "alleged wrongdoing that must be resolved for all class members." Id.; see also Fraley, 339 Ark. at 335, 5 S.W.3d at 431 ("[C]onsideration of affirmative defenses at the class certification stage is an improper intrusion into the merits of the case.").

IV. Superiority

Even if common issues predominate, Philip Morris argues that a class action is not a superior method of adjudication. Rule 23(b) provides that a class action must be "superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Asbury Auto., 366 Ark. at 611, 237 S.W.3d at 469. This court has held that the superiority requirement is satisfied if class certification is the more efficient way of handling the case,

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