Cite as 2015 Ark. 73
B. Causation
Philip Morris's next argument against predominance is that plaintiffs must prove reliance to sustain their claims under the ADTPA. According to Philip Morris, proof of this element would destroy predominance because each individual smoker bought Lights for different reasons. Furthermore, Philip Morris maintains that even if plaintiffs need not prove reliance, the same problem exists for the causation element.
The relevant statute reads as follows: Any person who suffers actual damage or injury as a result of an offense or violation as defined in the ADTPA has a cause of action to recover actual damages. Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-113(f) (emphasis added). Here, the circuit court ruled that "[r]eliance is not a requirement for proceeding with any private cause of action under the ADTPA." The court went on to add that proving reliance would be "a legal impossibility in a case like the present matter where it is alleged [that Philip Morris] engaged in fraudulent nondisclosure and misinformation." Philip Morris argues that this was error, pointing to a case in which, they allege, this court ruled that reliance was an element of an ADTPA claim:
Asbury Automotive maintains that any determination of whether it violated the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act will require individualized inquiries. That is because one element of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act will involve the question of whether each individual class member relied on a car dealer's alleged deceptive conduct. Asbury Automotive further maintains that there are other individualized inquiries that must be made, such as how much each plaintiff paid for his or her purchase.
Asbury, 366 Ark. at 610–11, 237 S.W.3d at 469 (emphasis added). Philip Morris's use of this quote is misplaced, as it was a recitation of the appellant's argument in Asbury, not an
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