cause and effect. There is no dualism in this, for the Wirklichkeit is one and undivided. These are not separated things, in the sense of isolated, absolute, or abstract beings, although we may speak of them as such for our ephemeral purposes.
HISTORICAL.
This sketch is an abstract of six lectures given at Clark University in 1890. I. The animistic notion of the soul among the pre-Homeric and Homeric Greeks. They believed the soul to be closely connected with the breath, and to have its seat in general in the blood. Sensation, thought, and volition are functions of the living being, i.e. of the complex of soul and body, not of the soul alone. Psychical activities, including perception and thought, have their special seat in the breast. II. Thales, Hippo, Anaximenes, Diogenes of Apollonia, Herakleitos, Empedokles, and the Pythagorean school. The psychology of these philosophers is determined in the main by their cosmological theories. III. Demokritos and Anaxagoras. Demokritos regards the soul as distinct from the body, though on atomistic principles it is necessarily corporeal. These atoms are of the finest and most mobile kind; this harmonizes with the nature of thought as a subtle kind of motion. Demokritos' psychology is in the main a reproduction of primitive animism. Anaxagoras does not get wholly beyond the view of his predecessors that the soul is a refined form of matter. Up to his time he marks the widest departure from animism. IV. This lecture is devoted to a more detailed exposition of the views of Demokritos on the physiology and psychology of the senses. V. The Sophists, Sokrates, and Plato. The psychology of Plato is largely influenced by ethical considerations. There is no idea of the soul, for this would be equivalent to denying its immortality, which his ethical doctrine forbids. Plato, therefore, assigns the soul to a middle position between ideas and individual things. The Platonic divisions of the soul and sense-physiology occupy most of the lecture. VI. Aristotle. The doctrine of Entelechy, the classification of soul-functions, the physiology of the senses, and the doctrine of active and passive reason are briefly treated in pages 192-197, S. finds Aristotle's psychology distinctly monistic. Aristotle's method he characterizes as a biological-developmental one.
