of Döring is taken as representative of this position and criticised in detail. The egoistic hedonist is accused of the logical fallacy of solipsism, and the psychological error of substituting for the end of action in its concrete wholeness, a component part obtained by abstraction. The same logical fallacy is at the basis both of theoretical and practical solipsism. When it is asserted that there is nothing real except my idea, 'idea' loses its meaning and the statement comes to nothing. For 'idea' has meaning only in relation to that objective reality from which it is distinguished. If this does not exist, then 'idea' has entirely lost its significance. The logical contradiction fatal to solipsism is quite apparent, for its very intelligibility involves the existence of that reality which it denies. So it is with practical solipsism. The satisfaction of my will is to be understood only in reference to the satisfaction of other wills. But if every action is necessarily egoistic, then none are egoistic, for 'egoistic' is so broadened in meaning that it loses its distinct significance and is merged with altruistic. We are led simply to the recognition that the realization of every preconceived end involves pleasure, and that the representation of any desired object has an affective tone. But from this, the position of eudæmonism, it in nowise follows that the satisfaction of the self is the supreme end in human conduct. To maintain this is to fall victim to a glaring psychological error. In volition we represent an end and the means necessary to its accomplishment. Naturally, the end represented is affectively toned. It is not possible, however, to have a direct representation of a state of pleasure, but only a condition in which pleasure is one element. Therefore it is quite wrong to take this one element and make it the supreme end in conduct. The defender of hedonism is driven to maintain that the actual material out of which the ideal is constructed is related to its affective tone as means to end.H. W. Wright.
In a recent article M. Brochard has demanded that the modern science of ethics be freed from its theological presuppositions (as the notions of duty and of a moral law), and be allowed to develop naturally along the lines laid down by the great philosophers of antiquity; for if "the notion of duty were an essential idea of reason ... how could we explain the fact that it was never grasped by a Plato, an Aristotle, or an Epictetus?" But, says M. Cantecor, this idea is a true development within the order of ethical speculation. The spontaneous use of reason precedes a recognition of its laws; the idea of duty is implicit in that idea of the good which so dominates ancient philosophical thought. "The notion of an imperative law arises naturally within man's reason, without any necessary connection with the idea of a transcendent authority upon which it depends ... and the intuition of the necessity of such a law, or of a rational legislation, is the principal inspirer and regulator of all moral speculation."
