Page:Philosophical Review Volume 11.djvu/224

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208
THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.
[Vol. XI.

Etkik, and covers Parts III and IV of the German work, as indicated respectively in the two parts of the above title. The translator's excellent work in connection with this series has been already recognized, and the consequent expectations with which the reader approaches the present volume will be fully realized. It is no light task to translate the precise thought of an author into foreign phrase and idiom, preserving those nice distinctions and fine shades of meaning which tend to become obscure the moment they pass into another tongue, and at the same time to give some impression of the spirit of the author's work and the characteristic features of his style. The present translation has succeeded most happily in these respects, and will no doubt prove a valuable contribution to the English library of foreign authors.

It may seem ungracious to criticise one or two minor points in a work which manifests so many excellences, and yet perhaps it may be of some interest to point out a few phrases concerning which there may be at least a difference of opinion as to the most exact rendering of the German text. In the translator's "Preface" there is the statement: "Throughout the section on Legal Norms (pp. 160192), much of the significance of the discussion rests on the fact that the German word Recht means both 'law' and 'right.' The difficulty thus presented to the English reader has been somewhat lessened, it is hoped, by translating the phrase subjektives Recht ’subjective law, or right,' and objektives Recht 'objective right, or law.'" Would there not be less confusion in the mind of the English reader if the phrases were translated simply 'subjective right' and 'objective right' throughout the whole discussion, for when the phrase 'objektives Recht' is equivalent to positive law, the context will in every case show it unmistakably. Moreover, Wundt generally adds by way of a more exact statement some such explanatory phrase as 'the legal order, etc.,' p. 176. Again in the title of section (c), p. 116, the phrase Die Verkettung der unsittlichen Motive is translated 'the connection of the unmoral motives.' The exposition which runs through this section gives the impression of a natural linking together of these unmoral motives which the term 'connection' does not fully convey, but which the term Die Verkettung does. The word 'concatenation' would appear perhaps a trifle strained; the 'interrelation' or 'the affinity of the immoral motives ' might express more adequately the point in question. Still another phrase, the title of section (b), p. 132, Gebietende und verbietende Normen, is translated 'positive and negative norms.' Would it not be better to render the phrase 'mandatory and prohibitive norms'? This would seem especially fitting, inasmuch as these words are commonly used by ethical writers almost as technical terms. However, a minor difference of opinion or of taste in translating must yield to the deeper feeling of appreciation and congratulation upon a work so admirably done.

The translation bears upon each page a reference to the number of the corresponding page in the German edition. This is a great convenience