Page:Philosophical Review Volume 11.djvu/615

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No. 6.]
SPENCER'S THEORY OF ETHICS.
599

As the life-process takes on higher forms, these two must interact and their evolution proceed together. Looked at in this way, the relationship between organism and environment appears as a changing one on both sides ; there is no specific group of processes which is always the organism, and another group which is always environment; indeed, the same kind of process may belong now on one side and now on the other. Spencer seems to identify organism with some sort of animal structure; muscle, tissue, blood, and their functions, and to account as environment the more obviously external circumstances of air, water, food, and so on. Such a definition is certainly too rigid and exclusive, for we can mark the distinction of environment within the activities of the animal itself; a habit which at one time furthers the animal's interest as a stimulation may at another time become a hostile or obstructive force which has to be reckoned with. Suppose, however, that one accepts the characterization of the life-function which some of the functional psychologists have given, that it maintains a "circular activity"[1] or perpetuates its own stimulation, then one may place the criterion of what constitutes an organism in the nearness or immediacy with which that function is forwarded. One may say that, within the circular process, the organism is the phase which stands for the immediate continuation, or for present stimulation, and the environment is the means of the mediate phase of the perpetuation. But it must be kept in mind that any specific process may be now organism and again environment. This relation is analogous to the psychological distinction of attention and habit. Attention is the immediate point at which the organization of consciousness is going on, and habit corresponds to environment. Just as, in conscious life, evolution brings out more and more clearly the difference between attention and habits, accentuating the function and the efficiency of each, so organism and environment are developed side by side and with mutual reference to each other.

The Psychological View. From this point of view, Spencer calls the end of evolution, and the criterion of good conduct, pleasure.

  1. Baldwin.