Page:Philosophical Review Volume 13.djvu/257

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243
SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.
[Vol. XIII.

his disciples on this present life. Such examples show that a strong desire for personal survival after death is essential for the origin and maintenance of a belief in immortality. Where this desire is lacking, the belief will be lacking also. This desire is but another form of the natural search for self-preservation. If our life is unhappy, we hope for another which will be happy; if it is happy, we hope that death will not end it. This hope we extend to those dear to us; but the image of the future life will vary with the individual,—the Northman's Valhalla is not the Mohammedan's Paradise. But the desire to live is not the sole source of the belief; another source is the power of the imagination, especially as seen in dreams. This is especially operative among primitive peoples, whose vivid dreams of the dead are a powerful persuasive to such a belief. By a contrary path extreme scepticism may lead to the belief. Men regard this life as a fleeting and deceptive dream; religious feelings in connection with this thought arouse the hope of an awaking in which its enigmas shall be solved. Another motive is the connatural appeal of dualism as a theory to men at large; the body wastes away, but the soul remains. And not the least im- portant is the moral motive, the revolt against the apparent injustice of this present life, and consequent expectation of future compensation. Many could not lead a thoroughly moral life without this hope. This sentiment is at the foundation of the Buddhistic doctrine of 'Karma.' Just as many minds feel forced to believe in a fundamental order in the physical world, in spite of the multiplicity of phenomena; so others are forced to believe in universal moral order, and not seeing it realized in this world, to conceive a supersensible world as a postulate. And finally, as a motive which is perhaps less weighty in logic, but of great moral value, and confined to a small number, we find the desire for moral perfection, for an opportunity in a future life of closer approach to the moral ideal.

Edmund H. Hollands.
Relativity and Finality in Ethics. T. C. Hall. Int. J. E., XIV, 2, pp. 150-161.

A need is universally felt for authoritative criteria of conduct which possess abstract infallibility. Though relativity in other spheres of knowledge is accepted, it fails to satisfy in the sphere of duty. The sense of oughtness in the child is first awakened by training, and takes form in obedience to parental commands. Such obedience gives rise to a desire for infallible ethical authority in the tribe, and the sense of being bound by unrationalized obligation is the essence of primitive morality. If the sense of duty be necessary to human progress, how discover finality for it? The social advantages of symbols of abstract authority in counteracting selfish motives are patent; but, as these disappear, the sense of duty must be cultivated without them. Where individual and group interests clash, unreasoned racial impulses must afford guidance. Historically, religion has shown, and will continue to show to men the value of obedience to duty, as