Page:Philosophical Review Volume 13.djvu/260

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.
[Vol. XIII.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Studien zur Werttheorie. Von Robert Eisler. Leipzig, Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1902.—pp. xii, 112.

A study of the history and of the philosophy of art led the author to take up the problem of the general theory of value; and the result of his reflection is to be found in this brochure, which contains five essays: I, The Problem of a Law of Motivation; II, Formal Analysis of the Historical Process and Introduction of the Concept of Value; III, Value as a Quantitative Concept. Measurement of Values; IV, The Psychological Correlates of the Historical Process; and V, The Theory of the Judgment of Value. The solution of the general problem involved in the theory of value is found in biological and not in psychological terms. Neither the common sense view that value is a quality belonging objectively to external things, nor the psychological view that it is the pleasingness or the desiredness of things is accepted as satisfactory. Although the author uses such expressions as 'voluntative' and 'acts of will' in stating his doctrine, these terms are used "without any reference to the traditional psychological content of these concepts. What is meant is always only the process in its biological significance." A voluntative reaction is merely the change that takes place in a 'biological individuality,' when reacting upon an environment. Thus if, upon the approach of a heated object, I withdraw my hand, this withdrawal is a 'voluntative reaction,' even though it takes place without any intervention of consciousness. The fundamental thesis that is propounded is found in the following sentence: "We say that a definite complex of phenomena is evaluated when its realization appears as dependent upon the 'voluntative' action of a biological factor; and we ascribe to it a positive value when its realization appears as brought about by the activity of the subject in question, a negative value when its realization appears as voluntatively inhibited" (pp. 23-24). It should follow that if, while standing upon the edge of a precipice, I am startled by a sudden noise and topple over, the fall has a positive value as compared with the experience of hearing the noise. This theory is beautifully simple and removes all possibility of difficult complications, only what is meant by value does not seem to correspond in the least with what is usually meant by that term.

The book, however, is not without its value even to one who declines to consider his biological reaction upon it as definitive. For instance, the fourth essay is a very interesting and in many respects convincing discussion of an important psychological question, that of the will. It may be a lamentable weakness in the reviewer's make-up, but he must confess that the introduction of mathematical formulæ into a discus-