problem as to the ultimate meaning of morals is only touched upon here, and that in a brief Appendix. But the assertion and denial of the Will, and the metaphysical implications of self-renunciation, form the theme of the last book of The World as Will and Idea, which Schopenhauer himself considers to be the most serious part of his system.[1]
The object of this study is, first, to state as briefly and concisely as seems expedient Schopenhauer's own account and criticism of Kant's theory of ethics; secondly, to outline Schopenhauer's statement of the fundamental principle and the basis of morals, indicating also the significance of the ethics of sympathy with regard to the basal spirit of his whole philosophy; thirdly, to attempt something by way of criticism of what appears to be the principal source of confusion in both Kant's and Schopenhauer's notions of the real significance of morality for philosophy; and, in conclusion, to suggest a possible means of solving the problem of ethics in terms of concrete human experience
I.
First of all, then, what is Kant's method of ethics? In his Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten Kant attempts to find out and establish the supreme principle of morality. "This alone," Kant says, "constitutes a study complete in itself, and one which ought to be kept apart from every other moral investigation."[2] Kant's problem in the Grundlegung is ostensibly the same as that posited by the Danish Royal Society. His plan, however, is to construct a moral philosophy on the a priori basis of 'pure practical reason.' The principles of ethics, he asserts, cannot be based on experience, for an experience-grounded morality would lack that 'rational necessity' which he considers indispensable. What men ought to do, Kant says, can be determined by a priori reasoning—regardless of what men actually do, or can reasonably be expected to do. "Even though there might never yet have been a sincere friend, yet not a whit the less is pure sincerity in friendship required of every man, because, prior
