Page:Philosophical Review Volume 24.djvu/34

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18
THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.
[Vol. XXIV.

that the fuller realization should be in the latter part. Simply to say, however, that the quality of the later stages is, somehow, more important than that of the earlier does not characterize adequately the peculiar relation that we suppose to exist. For many of our evaluations of life apparently imply the belief that the quality of the later stages is not merely more important, but of supreme importance, so that the quality of the earlier stages seems to have been wiped out by that of subsequent ones. Later happiness atones for earlier unhappiness (makes it as if it had not been), later goodness for earlier moral defect, later intellectual or æsthetic activity for an earlier want of it. But earlier joy does not atone in like manner for the later sorrow, nor earlier goodness for the later moral downfall, nor an earlier high level of thought and æsthetic sensibility for the later low level. The value of the later stages seems to cancel or destroy that of the earlier, but not to be in turn canceled by it. Thus the later stages seem to stand for the earlier in a way in which the earlier cannot stand for the later.[1]

Now we saw that the extent to which a value is affected by these temporal relations appears to depend upon the degree of its fusion with the personality. Truth and beauty, considered quite in themselves, are above the vicissitudes of time and change. And even as the products of human activity, they are, regarded from one point of view, equally secure. The greatness of a scientific or artistic achievement cannot be destroyed by any later failure on the part of its author. But our estimate of the intellectual or æsthetic worth of the man, as distinguished from that of the particular achievement, is more or less affected by his subsequent failure. It is not then value as such that is influenced by temporal relations, but value as an integral part of human personality. And the reason why our estimate of hedonic and moral value seems to be more readily affected by temporal considerations is that these two ordinarily fuse with the personality more completely than intellectual and aesthetic value do.

  1. As a matter of convenience I shall regard the phrase 'supreme importance' as indicating this compensatory function that the later stages seem to have.