Page:Philosophical Review Volume 25.djvu/166

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154
THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.
[Vol. XXV.

And it is pretty clear that such a consideration does not uncommonly influence human judgments about higher and lower. We tend to prize things in proportion as we do not share them with others, and what is less esoteric we incline in comparison to despise. But it does not seem to be at all clear that this judgment is capable of being justified on reflection. After all, it would not be difficult to make out a case for the thesis that only that which is widely shared is properly human; and the contrary judgment is in detail on so many occasions due so obviously to a narrow and snobbish spirit, that it casts doubt on the principle itself. Even if it has an element of truth, at least it needs a much exacter statement before it can be accepted.

A more defensible claim would probably be that we regard that as higher in human nature which is more inclusive. This would lend itself readily enough to the preference for intellect over sense. It seems to me very doubtful whether this last means that we judge a life devoted to thought to be higher necessarily than one of intelligence brought to bear more directly on the material of the sense world. As a personal ideal, some would prefer it, and some would not; and I am inclined to think there would be the same lack of agreement in judgments about its intrinsic merits. But if you ask about the difference between a merely sensuous or passionate, and an intelligent, pursuit of any course whatever, there would hardly be much difference of opinion; and it is at least plausible to interpret this in terms of the wider range of life which intelligence opens up, and the added possibilities of enjoyment and achievement.

That this consideration has some part to play in our judgment is clear; but whether it settles the main problem is debatable. It is, it may be noticed first, still a quantitative judgment, a matter of more or less, and so shares in any doubt that may be raised about the moral obligatoriness of the quantitatively greater. We might, and frequently do, merely prefer the more to the less, while nevertheless approving the latter so far as it goes. Furthermore, it does not seem perfectly clear how far such a form of judgment will carry us. There are situations where we seem bound to raise the question of higher and lower that cannot