Seth and John Watson is noticeable; while among the classical writers Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, J. S. Mill, Spencer, and Green perhaps have contributed most.
The author, however, is no mere eclectic. He has assimilated this material and presents a systematic and coherent ethics of his own. An idealistic metaphysics is implied; but this is kept in the background, and probably would not be observed by the beginner. Clarity and consistency is accordingly gained by reason of the fact that the author knows the philosophical implications of all that he says, while the beginner is not confused by subtleties for which he is unprepared. While the author states that the book is primarily designed for training colleges for teachers, and while he is careful to make clear by illustration and comment the application of ethics to teaching, and while the subject of moral education is touched upon, the work is by no means a mere pedagogical handbook, but a well written and scholarly introduction to ethics that ought to be equally valuable for college undergraduates and general readers. For a statement that is extremely elementary, the undersigned, though he does not agree with the author in every detail, believes this to be the best new text in ethics that he has seen for some years.
Dartmouth College.
Professor Ogden's plan in writing this book has been to avoid discussion of the nervous system and the structure of sense organs, and to devote a comparatively brief space to the discussion of sensation and of experimental results, in order to have more room for the treatment of topics which seem to him to possess broader significance and closer relation to other subjects than psychology. His book is further characterized by the adoption of the point of view of the Würzburg School on imageless thought. In addition to sensations, images, and affections as conscious elements, thoughts, classified as notions and relations, are recognized. Directing tendencies are not merely posited as psychological factors, but play a part in the author's philosophical position, which is interactionism. The purposive activity of mind, he maintains, acts directly upon matter. There is a Cartesian reminiscence in the following statements. "The problem of mind as interacting with a body of energy does not necessarily mean a loss or gain in this finite quantity, since we need only assume for mind a peculiar capacity to direct energies toward definite ends" (page 212).
No doubt there are not a few teachers of psychology whose needs will be met by a textbook written from this point of view. The reviewer must confess that she is not among their number. Although a modern textbook should indeed make some reference to the problems of imageless thought and determining tendencies, it is doubtful whether these problems are yet sufficiently worked out to be given the position which Professor Ogden's discussion accords
