difficulties with the 'compounding of consciousness,' and his failure to appreciate Kant, without whom Renouvier's and his own contributions might have been impossible (p. 62, footnote). He also points out that James finally learned to interpret Hegel sympathetically (p. 197).
William K. Wright.
Dartmouth College.
The title of this essay is misleading. It is not so much an application of Freud's doctrine of the 'wish' to ethical theory as it is a contribution to behavioristic psychology and the new realism. The author had previously developed a realistic theory of cognition, and in the first two chapters of this book he modifies Freud's conception of the 'wish' so as to make it conform with this theory of his own. He thus makes the rich empirical data of the Freudian school available for his own point of view, and for the new realism. He proposes to substitute the 'wish' for the 'sensation' as the unit of psychology. The 'wish' is defined as "a course of action which some mechanism of the body is set to carry out, whether it actually does so or not," which is "dependent on a motor attitude of the physical body, which goes over into overt action and conduct when the wish is carried into execution " (pp. 3, 4). The 'wish' is more dynamic, concrete, objective, and functional than the 'sensation.'
In subsequent chapters the writer attempts to describe the formation of character in the terminology of the 'wish.' He succeeds in showing that some phases of character formation can be treated in this way. As opposed to the 'sensation' of structural psychology, which is utterly useless in problems of this kind, he makes a clear case indeed. But is the 'wish' the best substitute for the 'sensation'? Many of Professor Holt's picturesque illustrations involve relations between purposing personalities in social situations, and he does not succeed in doing justice to these in terms of the 'wish.' Professor Holt really does not appear to have been thorough enough in carrying out his own behavioristic principles. For he strongly insists that 'behavior' must be distinguished from mere reflex action. Even though behavior may be a coordination of reflexes, to describe it in terms of reflexes alone would be to lose sight of the principles of coordination, and to regard it too atomistically; it would be to utilize the 'bead theory' of causation that physics has abandoned (pp. 156 ff.). On the contrary, it is necessary to study the organization of these reflexes (pp. 160, f.). But Professor Holt's own account of moral choice at times comes perilously near to being a 'bead-theory' of 'wishes.' To be sure, he often speaks of the 'integration' of 'wishes,' and effectively contrasts this with 'suppression' and 'dissociation' which he shows are pathological and immoral. But he says nothing very definite about this 'integration' except that it involves 'discrimination.' But who or what does the discriminating? The whole self? He ought to tell us how 'wishes' become coordinated or integrated into sentiments and a self. Though it would be unfair to condemn the 'wish' because
