Page:Philosophical Review Volume 3.djvu/163

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No. 2.]
ANOMALIES IN LOGIC.
147

Our abstract rules have to be modified and supplemented by more special principles in order to have any application whatever. This seems to be precisely the case with the ordinary rules for Opposition. They are true and important for the conditions under which they have been formulated, but it is forgotten that they represent very few of the material conditions of common practice, and for that reason they have but a limited value. Logic, that intends to be a guide in practical life, must, therefore, supplement the imperfections of a theory of Opposition that has such a "limited liability" in application by a modified system of principles which conforms to the perplexities and complexities of actual thought, and it can thus lay a better claim to practical importance. I have made an effort in this article, though an imperfect one, to supply such a want, and it is to be trusted that the effort is not wholly unsuccessful. It should be remembered, however, that one of the most important lessons to be learned from the present study is the enormous complexity of the problem to be dealt with,—a complexity which explains the liability of the human mind to logical illusions and the equipment required to meet the responsibilities involved in profound discussions. At the same time I think the analysis above given of Opposition outside formal logic will show the possibility of reducing an apparently chaotic world to law and order, while showing that a large part of our every-day discussion proceeds upon much simpler principles than the common theory of Opposition recognizes.

Columbia College.