expressly designed to give instruction to beginners in philosophy, but it is, nevertheless, eminently available for that purpose. . . . The subject is presented with great simplicity, so that its leading ideas can be gathered by a mere glance at its contents." The need of an adequate Introduction to Philosophy has probably been felt by every teacher of that discipline, but it is to be feared that not even in the present case have we a book "eminently available for that purpose." And it is as an Introduction that the Primer will have to be criticised, for the author's treatment of the many topics which he considers is quite too cursory to permit of the book taking rank as a constructive work of importance.
To confess frankly at the outset that the Primer does not seem likely to fulfill its mission, is by no means sweeping condemnation. The difficulties in the way of writing such a book are very considerable,—greater than the author would seem to realize, if one may judge from the tone of the preface and the introduction. But while this is true, certain things one has a right to expect from the author of an Introduction to Philosophy. First and foremost, before treating of fundamental problems, he should state briefly, but somewhat exactly, the relations in which the various philosophical disciplines stand to each other. This Dr. Carus has nowhere attempted to do, which is the more unfortunate since, owing to his semi-positivistic standpoint, he is rather inclined to confuse the psychological and the metaphysical. Again, one would certainly wish that no more topics should be considered than could be treated with a certain degree of thoroughness. Indeed, a little 'padding' would not be out of place in a book of this class, in order to meet the beginner half-way. The Primer, on the other hand, touches upon nearly all the important problems of philosophy in the course of about two hundred pages, and is written in a sort of aphoristic style which can hardly fail to prove confusing to the beginner. But this is not all. Philosophical positions are often severely criticised without having been adequately expounded. The problems which have occupied even the greatest philosophers of the past may not all be real problems, but they cannot profitably be disposed of with an epigram. For instance, in the two-and-a-half pages devoted to "Noumena and Reality" there is nothing to indicate the real character of a problem which, however perverse, seems destined to prove immortal in the history of philosophy.
A word as to the author's metaphysical position. He himself defines it in his introduction as "Monistic Positivism or Positive Monism." Indeed, he says: "True positivism is monistic; true monism is positive,"—but he nowhere attempts to prove this thesis. One cannot but feel that the synthesis is effected, in part at least, by the loose sense in which the words are used. Moreover, it is not reassuring to be reminded that Positivism holds that "all knowledge, scientific, philosophical, and religious, is a description of facts"; and when it is said that "monism, in a word, signifies consistency," one cannot but reflect that this is nothing more nor less than what every philosopher claims for his system. As a matter of
