Page:Philosophical Review Volume 3.djvu/34

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.
[Vol. III.

them." Nor can I see how even my knowledge of the external world or of the mental states of other persons can be a knowledge of that which is 'beyond my consciousness' in any accurate sense of these words. The plain man certainly believes that he knows what is external to himself; but such a belief is entirely misrepresented by the epistemological realist, who declares that the plain man believes that he knows what is external to or beyond his consciousness. When the plain man talks of what is external to himself, he means what is external to his body; and that is exactly why he finds a theory of matter, such as that of Berkeley, so ridiculous. He 'refutes' Berkeley by kicking a stone, like Dr. Johnson, or by suggesting that an idealist should sit down on a gorse bush. If the plain man be made to think a little about the question, he will admit that the outside of his body, at least, is part of the external world; but he probably continues to speak of his digestive apparatus as inside him. If the plain man thinks about his soul or his mind, he probably pictures it as a thing, occupying space, however tiny, inside his body—a box within a box: he may locate it in his bosom or in his head, according to the physiology of his period and to the degree in which physiological notions have penetrated into ordinary speech. It is only in virtue of this crude picture-thinking that the plain man is induced to say that he knows anything external to his mind or consciousness. No valid argument in behalf of the theory of epistemological realism can be drawn from what Mr. Seth calls the "primary, instinctive, and irresistible belief of all mankind, nay of the whole animal creation."[1] For the epistemological theories of other animals I cannot profess to speak confidently, but I feel certain that the 'crude' or 'naïve' or 'uncritical realism' of the plain man is nothing more than his belief that the real world is the world of his sensations and of the mental constructs by which he has (without being aware of the process, save very dimly) got into the habit of interpreting them to himself: that is to say, the real world of the plain man's belief consists in sensations plus

  1. I, p. 506.