Page:Philosophical Review Volume 3.djvu/66

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.
[Vol. III.

Ethik nach Aristoteles; since this is, on the author's view, more valuable for practical use than the Kantian Ethic, just because it does not rest upon a single principle. Besides this, and apart from separate articles in the Dictionary and the second half [Letters 8-10] of no. 784, III, there remain to be mentioned, as forming part of Maimon's practical philosophy, the following essays:)

778) Maimon: Versuch einer neuen Darstellung des Moralprincips und Dedukzion seiner Realität. In the B. M. 1794. XXIV, November, pp. 402-453. (Against this:)

779) An Herrn Salomon Maimon: über eine Stelle in dessen Aufsatz. 1793 [sic!] November, No. 5. In the B. M. 1795. XXV, January, pp. 57-6o. (Answered by Maimon, in no. 781, pp. 339, 340.)

780) Maimon: Ueber die ersten Gründe des Naturrechts. In the Nth. Ph. I. 1, 2. 1795. pp. 141-174.

781) Maimon: Ueber die ersten Grundsätze des Naturrechts. In the B. M. 1795. XXV, April, pp. 310-341. (To p. 339 in almost verbal agreement with no. 780, pp. 142-168.)

782) Maimon: Ueber die ersten Gründe der Moral. In the Nth. Ph. I. VIII, 3. 1798. pp. 165-190. (Maimon's practical philosophy depends for its principles upon a series of erroneous inferences. He diverges in it more from Kant, perhaps, than in the theoretical philosophy. The highest good is found in the cognition of truth. Kant's "action motived simply by conformity to duty" does not exist. The only motives are pleasant feelings; so that the motive of moral action is that universally valid, pure satisfaction in one's own dignity which is bound up with every action of the faculty of knowledge. Alongside of this material happiness-principle appears a formal one, similar to that of Kant. This is developed by Maimon, in subtle fashion, from the principle of the superior faculty of knowledge, the striving after truth, that is, after the making our knqwledge universally valid. In the same way he derives practical freedom, from which, however, only good deeds spring, from the independence of our superior faculty of knowledge as regards laws of nature. Following the Stoics, therefore, Maimon regards only the virtuous as such as being free. He knows nothing of personal immortality.—To the field of history of philosophy belongs:)

783) Maimon; Ueber die Progressen der Philosophie veranlasst durch die Preisfrage der königl. Akademie zu Berlin für das Jahr 1792: Was hat die Metaphysik seit Leibniz und Wolf für Progressen gemacht? Large 8vo. Berlin. 1793. Vieweg the younger. pp. 56. (Philosophy since Leibniz has won (I) three new sciences,—Morals, Natural Law, and Aesthetics; (2) an entirely new kind of philosophy, namely, the critical; (3) and a not exactly new, but nevertheless hitherto invariably misunderstood manner of philosophizing, namely, the sceptical method. No. 783 was included, as the first essay, in the following:)

784) Maimon: Streifereien im Gebiete der Philosophie. Part I. Large