Page:Philosophical Review Volume 3.djvu/769

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753
SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.
[Vol. III.

HISTORICAL.

La logique de Hegel. La science de l'être. G. Noël. Rev. de Mét, II, 3, pp. 270-298.

The realm of the doctrine of Being is that of immediate Being and its immediate determinations, quality, quantity, measure. Being can be conceived only in unity with its contrary, Nothing, that is, as Becoming. Absolute Becoming is the disappearance alike of Being and Nothing, and with them, of itself. It must become fixed, as determinate being. Here the determination is the same as being itself, and makes of it, Quality. The same process must be gone through for Nothing, arriving at Privation. Out of these two arises the Somewhat, whose relativity leads first to finitude, then to infinity, thence to infinite becoming. But each of the opposed terms in this progressus denies itself only to reaffirm itself. Thus regarded as self-determining, it passes us over to the One. The One disperses itself into Plurality. The truth is in neither, but in their union, Quantity. Quantity can be effectively determined only by Quality; therefore the truth passes to the unity of these two, in Measure. Being is, then, one, continuous and immutable, as quantified; multiple, discontinuous, and changing, as per quality. Thus conceived, Hegel calls it absolute indifference. This, having existence only in modifications to which it is indifferent, is absolute contradiction. But indifference of its own immediate being, and thereby of the totality of being which is absorbed in it, is no longer indifference, but Essence, absolute mediation, whose point of view subjectively is Reflection. The doctrine of Being thus deals with the problems of Greek speculation. Hegel is the only philosopher since Aristotle to treat them systematically, and had the reward of finding again philosophy, in its own history, and of showing the continuity of its evolution through diversity of systems.

H. C. Howe.
Der Einfluss Demokrit's auf Galilei. Löwenheim. Ar. f. G. Ph., VII, 2, pp. 230-268.

In view of the fact that historians now regard Galilei rather than Bacon or Descartes as the founder of modern science and philosophy, the author has for some years been engaged in studying the development of the former's system. The results of this study he promises soon to lay before the world in three large volumes, but here wishes