example, one is absorbed in a process of abstract thought, as in dealing with certain mathematical problems, there are successive moments to which neither of the terms 'good' or 'ill' applies with any degree of force. Slight sensations of strain and pressure are all that one can recall as determining the feeling element in the experience, and these are usually so faint as to give it no 'tone.' The affective state is at its minimum intensity. Could this be wholly eliminated and the process of thought made continuous, a mode of existence would be reached, concerning which it would be altogether superfluous to raise the question of good or evil. But the duration of such abstraction is brief. Immediately the affective state rises into prominence. We perceive that our work is progressing well or ill, that the result is right or wrong, and we feel pleasure or displeasure accordingly. We note, perhaps, with a kind of æsthetic satisfaction, how unerringly a law or formula is working, or we perceive the significance of what has been accomplished for the outcome of the day's work. In the affective states accompanying these various ideas is found the measure of their value—that by virtue of which they are pronounced good or evil. Illustrations of the well-nigh complete absence of the affective element in consciousness might be largely multiplied. The experience often attends the continuous performance of some mechanical process which requires a good deal of attention. But, however induced, the common mark of all such experiences is the reduction of the sense of value in existence, whether positive or negative. This rises, for good or for evil, only with an increase in the intensity of the affective state.
It is particularly instructive to attempt to reverse this process of abstraction by supposing sensibility retained, and the other elements of consciousness eliminated. A being so constituted would still be susceptible to good and evil. Although feeling would be totally blind, it would nevertheless mean weal or woe to the subject of it. One naturally calls to mind Lotze's striking comparison of the crushed worm, writhing in pain, with the angel endowed with consummate intelligence, but without feeling.[1] Criteria of value are applicable to the existence of the worm, but not to that
- ↑ Miscrocosmus (Eng. trans.), Vol. I, p. 250; cf. also pp. 692-4.
