Page:Philosophical Review Volume 8.djvu/145

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129
BUTLER'S VIEW OF HUMAN NATURE.
[Vol. VIII.

it is maintained that he predominantly conceives of benevolence and self-love as coördinate principles of our nature, both alike being under the supreme authority of conscience. But those who give this account, which seems to me undeniably the true one, are too apt to concede that his treatment is wavering and inconsistent, and that his system cannot stand the test of close analysis.

It must always be remembered, however, that Butler never wrote a systematic treatise on ethics, and that we must gain our view of his position chiefly from a few sermons which were preached at various times during a course of eight years, and the collection of which for publication was, as he himself tells us, in great measure accidental. It is, therefore, to be expected that many statements will be found, which, if taken literally and out of their connection, will result in inconsistency and confusion. Consequently, to gain a correct estimate of his system it is necessary to endeavor to ascertain as far as possible from an examination of the context, what Butler intended to say, to read out of his sermons what is implicit, rather than to stand upon the letter of his statement.

Now, the central and distinguishing feature of Butler's theory is his view of human nature as an organic whole. It is this broad and comprehensive view, upon which all his speculation is based, that preserves him from the one-sidedness of his predecessors and contemporaries, and of many later writers as well. And, therefore, it is but the fairness necessary for sympathetic exposition to read everything in the light of this central doctrine. Although it is true that his view of human nature as a constitutional and harmonious whole is always recognized, its significance for the system does not seem to be sufficiently appreciated. Otherwise such stress would not be laid upon "the irreconcilable contradictions" of his thought. It is only by losing sight of his basal stand-point, that, for example, one could be led to take a random passage or two with over great seriousness, and arrive at the conclusion that Butler resolves virtue either into prudence or into benevolence. Every analysis of the different principles of human nature which our author makes should always be read in