Page:Philosophical Review Volume 8.djvu/340

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.
[Vol. VIII.

ism' we give expression to the fact that living matter has certain distinctive properties, it may be freely accepted; but if by it we imply that these properties neither are nor can be the outcome of evolution, it should be rejected; and further that if by vital force we mean the noumenal cause of the special modes of molecular motion that characterize protoplasm, its metaphysical validity may be acknowledged so long as it is regarded as immanent in the dynamical system, and not interpolated from without in a manner unknown throughout the rest of the wide realm of nature.

Marion Hamilton Carter.

PSYCHOLOGICAL.

Tonverwandschaft und Tonverschmelzung. Theodor Lipps. Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn., XIX, 1, pp. 1-40.

The subject of this article is an extended discussion of Stumpf's Consonance Theory. The author points out where he agrees with Stumpf, and where he differs from him as he interprets the theory. Consonance of tones for Stumpf is equivalent to degrees of blending of tones (Verschmelzung). This definition is carefully examined in order to bring out its true significance. The conclusion reached is that Verschmelzung can mean nothing else than the flowing together of two contents of consciousness so that they are perceived as one. Consonance is an agreement which is accompanied by a feeling of pleasure, and yet the degree of pleasure is not proportionate to the degree of consonance. The author then states his own solution. Between certain tones there is an agreement in vibration, and also a corresponding agreement in the related psychical processes. This agreement he calls Tonverwandtschaft, and in it he sees the essence of consonance. He regards Stumpf s Verschmelzung only as the symptoms of this essence or Tonverwandtschaft.

Harry L. Taylor.
Zur Parallelismusfrage. G. Heymans. Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn., XVII, 1 and 2, pp. 62-105.

The writer's purpose is to work out more fully the position of Fechner and Ebbinghaus, which is monistic in so far as it recognizes the uniformity of the nature of reality, parallelistic in so far as it confirms the necessity of thinking this reality as arranged in two parallel series complete in themselves. While the law of psychical causality is derived from an investigation of our representations, feelings, judgments, etc., the law of physical causality can be known only through the effects of the outside world upon us. Physiology states that some, probably all, conscious processes depend upon certain material processes within the brain. As often as conscious processes occur, real processes are given which under favorable conditions produce definite perceptions of brain processes in consciousness. These real processes not perceived, but presupposed, are not distinct from the