Society"), of the Esquisse d'une philosophie. The first chapter deals with certain general considerations as to the relation of temporal to spiritual society as before defined, and as to the principles and plan of the subsequent chapters. Chapter II treats of the family as the unit of society, and in connection therewith, briefly, of polygamy and divorce.
This article is on the divisions of the Stoic Ethics. The author classifies these divisions as follows: I. (a) Doctrine of impulse; (b) Doctrine of the end; (c) Doctrine of virtue. II. (a) On the good, the evil, and the indifferent; (b) On the worth of things, and corresponding determination of conduct; (c) On duty. III. (a) On the passions; (b) Regulation of passions in terms of encouragement and suppression. This classification refers to Chrysippus, and is based on Diog. Laet., vii, 84. The twofold division of 'theoretical,' and 'practical' or 'parainetic,' is given by Kleanthes and Seneca. 'Parainetic' applies to III b, and 'theoretical,' which interprets the fundamental principles of conduct, applies to all the other parts in the above classification.
A large part of the Hermotimus and the Parasite has for its source three of the tropes of the younger Sceptics, and exhibits striking relationship to Sextus Empiricus. The author finds further in Hermot., c. 62, in the παρὰ τὰς ποσότητας, reference to the tropes of Aenesidemus. Lucian combats dogmatic philosophy with the weapons of scepticism. In the Cynico-Stoic portrayal of εὐδαιμονία (c. 5) reference is made to the Pinax of Ps.-Cebes. Also in Lucian's Ἔρωτες the author finds the weapons employed by the two characters, Charicles and Callicratidas, drawn from the Cynico-Stoic and Epicurean arsenal, and apropos of c.28 (Amores) cites Diog. Laet. on Diog. Sinop., 6, 65.
