In a perfect being there can be no longer will. The presence of will is the sign of imperfection. Activity is the indication of incompleteness. All life is aspiration, but the end is to quench aspiration in completeness. To this end every imperfect being unconsciously tends by nature. The end is not peculiar to the individual, it is universal and essential. To become conscious of the end of one's nature, and to know the means of attaining it is to become free, for freedom consists in consciously willing the universal. By this principle moral judgment of action becomes possible, the nature of the good is determined, and whatever Kant has said to the contrary, a material theory of morals is possible.
In the remaining chapter of the book, M. Cresson institutes a comparison of the Kantian theory, on the one hand, with the Stoic, and on the other, with the Christian, ethics. Had he taken the same pains to give a just and adequate view of the latter, as he has given of the former, the result of the comparison would have been essentially different. He finds, however, that although the Kantian theory shows outward resemblance to Stoic and to Christian morality, it is really a very distinct system from either. The Stoic doctrine grounds moral obligation in reason and the constitution of human nature, the Christian, in the will of God, and solicits obedience by hope and fear. For the Kantian theory, duty is the last word, and must be obeyed purely for its own sake.
This book is a noteworthy contribution to the controversy regarding the relation between evolution and ethics. Its main thesis is that morality is based on sympathy, and that sympathy is evolved in the struggle for existence. Accordingly, in his preface Mr. Sutherland mentions Charles Darwin and Adam Smith as the writers to whom he is most deeply indebted. "Full half of the book is the detailed expansion of the fourth and fifth chapters of the Descent of Man." This expansion, however, has involved a considerable amount of independent reflection and research, and the view of ethics developed in the second volume shows even more clearly the stamp of the author's own individuality.
The first volume contains an explanation of the origin of sympathy, and an account of its growth from its first appearance in the form of
