Page:Philosophical Transactions - Volume 001.djvu/322

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more known to us, than that of Spirits upon Bodies, or of Bodies upon Spirits; and yet most men admire nothing but this, believing to know the other: whereas he judges, that all things being well examin'd, the Action of Bodies upon Bodies is no more conceivable, than that of Spirits upon Bodies. Mean while the opinion of the Authour touching this subject, is, That the union of Soul and Body consists onely in this, that certain motions of the Body are followed by certain Cogitations of the Soul, and, on the contrary, that certain Thoughts of the Soul are follow'd by certain Motions of the Body. And, having supposed, that Bodies are said to act upon one another, when they cause some change suitable to Extension, and Spirits to act upon one another, when they cause some change suitable to a Thought; he infers, that when a Body acts upon a Spirit, that cannot be by causing any change of motion, of figure, or parts, as having none of all these; nor when a Spirit acts upon a Body, that cannot be by producing any change of Thought, as having none: But, when this Body, or its motion, or figure, or other thing, depending upon its nature, can be perceived by a Spirit, so as, upon that occasion, this Spirit has thoughts, it had not before, it may be said, that the Body has acted upon this Spirit, for as much as it has caused all the change in it, whereof it was capable according to its nature.

In the Sixth, After he hath shew'd, what is to be understood by what we call Soul, and by what we call Body, he labours to make it out, that we are much more assured of the Existence of the Soul, than of that of the Body, which he conceives he can prove from hence, that we cannot doubt, that we think, because even doubting is thinking; but one may doubt, whether one has a body, for several reasons, which he alledges, and thinks so cogent, that he concludes, it is not evident to him by the light of reason, that he has a Body. But supposing, there be Bodies, he examines, what are the Operations, that belong to the Soul, and what those, that belong to the Body; and lastly, what those, that result from the Union of both: And then explains, how all those operations are perform'd, and particularly, Sensation; where he shews, that the Nerves, holding at one end to the Brain, whereof they are but Allongations, and being at the other end extended to the extremities of the Body; when an Object comes to touch those exterior ends of the Nerves, the interior ones in the Brain are presently shaken, and cause different sensations according to the diversitie of Nerves, and the differing manner, in which they are shaken. And to shew, that 'tis this shaking, that causes Sensation, he notes, that if any thing shakes the interior parts of the Nerves, though the object be absent, the Soul has presently the same sen-

sations