PLUTARCH'S MORALS
OF MORAL VIRTUE
THE SUMMARY
[Before he entereth into the discourse of virtues and vices, he treateth of moral virtue in general: propounding in the first place the diversity of opinions of philosophers as touching this point: the which he discusseth and examineth: Wherein after that he had begun to dispute concerning the composition of the soul, he adjoineth his own opinion touching that property which moral virtue hath particularly by itself, as also wherein it differeth from contemplative philosophy. Then having defined the mediocrity of this virtue, and declared the difference between continence and temperance, he speaketh of the impression of reason in the soul. And by this means addresseth himself against the Stoics, and disputeth concerning the affections of the soul: proving the inequality therein, with such a refutation of the contrary objections, that after he had taught how the reasonless part of the soul ought to be managed, he discovereth by divers similitudes and reasons, the absurdities of the said Stoic philosophers, who, instead of well governing and ruling the soul of man, have as much as lieth in them, extinguished and abolished the same.]
My purpose is to treat of that virtue which is both called and also reputed moral, and namely wherein it differeth especially from virtue contemplative: as having for the subject matter thereof the passions of the mind, and for the form, reason: Likewise of what nature and substance it is; as also, how it doth subsist and hath the being: to wit, whether that part of the soul which is capable of the said virtue be endued and adorned with reason as appropriate and peculiar unto it; or, whether it borrow it from other parts, and so receiving it, be like unto things mingled, and adhering to the better: or rather, for that being under the government and rule of another, it be said to participate the power and puissance of that which commendeth it? For, that virtue also may subsist and have an essential being, without any subject matter and mixture at all, I suppose it is very evident and apparent. But first and foremost, I hold
