But leaving these examples, I would gladly demand and ask of them if when they see dogs, horses, and birds, which we nourish and keep in our houses, brought to that pass by use, feeding, and teaching, that they learn to render sensible words, to perform certain motions, gestures, and divers feats, both pleasant and profitable unto us; and likewise, when they read in Homer how Achilles encouraged to battle both horse and man; they do marvel still and make doubt, whether that part and faculty in us, whereby we are angry, do lust, joy, or grieve, be of that nature that it can well obey reason, and be so affected and disposed thereby that it may give assent thereto: considering especially that it is not seated or lodged without, nor separated from us, nor yet framed by anything which is not in us: no, nor shapen by forcible means and constraint, to wit, by mould, stroke of hammer, or any such thing; but as it is fitted and forged by nature, so it keepeth to her, is conversant with her, and finally perfected and accomplished by custom and continuance. Which is the reason that very properly manners be called in Greek by the name ἦθος, to give us to understand that they are nothing else (to speak plainly and after a gross manner) but a certain quality imprinted by long continuance of time in that part of the soul which of itself is unreasonable: and is named ἦθος, for that the said reasonless part framed by reason taketh this quality or difference (call it whether you will) by the means of long time and custom, which they term ἦθος. For reason is not willing to root out quite all passions (which were neither possible nor expedient), but only it doth limit them within certain bounds, and setteth down a kind of order: and thus after a sort causeth moral virtues not to be impassibilities, but rather mediocrities and regularities, or moderations of our affections: and this it doth by the means of prudence and wisdom, which reduceth the power of this sensual and pathetical part unto a civil and honest habitude. For these three things (they say) are in the soul of man, to wit, a natural puissance or faculty, a passion or motion, and also an habitude. Now the said faculty or power is the very beginning, and (as a man would say) the matter of passions, to wit, the power or aptness to be angry, to be ashamed, or to be confident and bold. The passion is the actual moving of the said power: namely, anger itself, shame, confidence or boldness. The habitude is a settled and confirmed strength established in the sensual or unreasonable part by continual use and custom: which if the passions be ill governed by reason, becometh to be a vice; and contrariwise,
